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Abstract
I present a decision problem in which causal decision theory appears to vio-
late the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and normal-form extensive-
form equivalence (NEE). I show that these violations lead to exploitable behavior
and long-run poverty. These consequences appear damning, but I urge cau-
tion. Causalists can dispute the charge that they violate IIA and NEE in this case
by carefully specifying when options in different decision problems are similar
enough to be counted as the same.
As I’ll understand it here, the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) says
that adding an additional, irrelevant, option to the menu can’t transform an
impermissible choice into a permissible one. An old story attributed to Sidney
Morgenbesser illustrates the seeming irrationality of violating this principle:
asked to decide between steak and chicken, a man says “I’d rather have the
steak”. The waiter tells him that they also have fish, to which he responds: “Oh,
in that case, I’ll have the chicken”. This behavior looks irrational, and a principle
like IIA explains why. The principle is quite plausible; all else equal, we should
want a theory of rational choice which vindicates it.
The principle I’ll call normal-form extensive-form equivalence (NEE) says
that, so long as you’re certain to not change your beliefs or desires, and you’re
certain to remain rational, if it’s permissible to choose an option other than X,
then, if you’re given the choice to either haveX or go on to choose amongst the
other options, it is permissible to choose to leave X behind.1 If, given a choice
between chicken, steak, and fish, it’s permissible for you to order the steak,
then, given a choice between the fish and a choice between chicken and steak,
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1. This is a weakened version of the principle usually called ‘normal-form extensive-form equiv-
alence’; it only infers something about ‘extensive-form’ permissibility from ‘normal-form’ per-
missibility, and it only does so in special conditions. For this reason, it is a bit uncomfortable to
name the principle an ‘equivalence’, but I’ll stick to this terminology nonetheless.
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it’s permissible to decline the fish. Like IIA, this principle is very plausible; all
else equal, we should want a theory of rational choice which vindicates it.
Here, I’ll present a decision problem—called ‘Utility Cycle’, for reasons
which will become clear—in which orthodox causal decision theory (CDT) ap-
pears to violate both IIA (§2.1) and NEE (§2.2). In minor variants of Utility
Cycle, these violations lead causalists to engage in exploitable behavior like
paying to have options presented to them in a certain order, and paying to
change their decision once it’s been made, for no apparent reason (§2.3). These
consequences look bad. Some will see them as a reason to reject CDT. But
I will urge caution. Principles like IIA and NEE compare two decision prob-
lems in which you are given the same options. So in order to show that CDT
violates IIA or NEE, we must make some assumptions about what it takes for
options in different decision problems to count as the same. Given a natural as-
sumption about what makes options the same, CDT will violate IIA and NEE.
But I’ll suggest an alternative approach to causalists which allows them to sat-
isfy the principles (§§3–4). I’ll additionally counsel causalists to defend their
exploitable behavior as an intrapersonal tragedy of the commons: agents in-
capable of binding themselves to a course of action can be led to predictable
financial ruin through a series of rational actions, in just the same way that
society may be predictably led to collective tragedy through a series of individ-
ually rational actions (§4).
1 Causal DecisionTheory
1.1 Desire. I will assume that, when you face a decision, you have some set of
available optionsO = {X1,X2, . . . ,XN } between which you must choose. When
making this choice, there is some set of states of nature K = {K1,K2, . . . ,KM},
which, for all you know, may obtain.2 Exactly one of the Ki obtains, though
you know not which; nor are you in any position to influence which obtains.
Though you do not know whichKi obtains, you do have opinions, represented
with a probability function, Pr, defined over both O and K. Finally, we can
represent your desires with a function, D, which says how strongly you desire
that you select each option, in each state of nature. I assume that, for any option
X ∈O,
D(X) =
∑
K
Pr(K | X) ·D(XK)
D(X) tells us how good you would expect things to be, were you to learn that
you have chosenX. IfD(X) is high, then you should be glad to learn that you’ve
chosen X—low, and you should be sad to learn that you’ve chosen X.
2. Throughout, I’ll use letters like ‘X’ and ‘K ’ to stand both for options and states and the propo-
sition that you’ve chosen those options and that those states obtain. Context will disambiguate.
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[D(Row Col) KL KM
L 100 0
M 110 10
] [Pr(Row|Col) L M
KL 90% 10%
KM 10% 90%
]
Table 1: Desires and Probabilities for Newcomb. The matrix on the left shows how
strongly you desire choosing the row option while in the column state. The matrix on
the right shows the probability that you are in the row state, given that you’ve chosen
the column option.
1.2 Newcomb. Some—known as evidential decision theorists—think that
D(X) provides a measure of the choiceworthiness of an option X.3 Causal de-
cision theorists disagree, because of cases like the following:
Newcomb
You are on a game show. Before you are two boxes, labelled ‘L’
and ‘M ’ (for ‘less’ and ‘more’). You may take one, and only one,
of the boxes. Money was placed in the boxes on the basis of a
reliable prediction. If it was predicted that you would take L, then
$100 was placed in box L, and $110 was placed in box M . If it
was predicted that you would takeM , then $0 was placed in box L
and $10 was placed in boxM . These predictions are 90% reliable—
that is, conditional on you selecting box X, the chance that it was
predicted that you would selectX is 90%. But nothing you do now
will affect how much money is in the boxes.
We can represent this decision problem with the two matrices shown in table 1.
There are two relevant states of nature. Either it was predicted that you would
take box L, ‘KL’, or it was predicted that you would take boxM , ‘KM ’. I suppose
that your desires are linear in dollars, so that the degree to which you desire
each option in each state are as shown in the D-matrix on the left of table 1.
The matrix on the right says: given that you choose box L, you’re 90% likely to
be in stateKL and 10% likely to be in stateKM . And, given that you choose box
M , you’re 10% likely to be in state KL and 90% likely to be in state KM .
In Newcomb, you should be happier to learn L than M , since
D(L) = Pr(KL | L) ·D(LKL) + Pr(KM | L) ·D(LKM )
= 90% · 100+10% · 0
= 90
while D(M) = Pr(KL |M) ·D(MKL) + Pr(KM |M) ·D(MKM )
= 10% · 110+90% · 10
3. For defenses of evidential decision theory, see Jeffrey (1965, 2004) and Ahmed (2014b).
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= 20
So evidential decision theorists advise you to take box L. But notice that, no
matter what was predicted, taking box M will get you strictly more money. In
each state of nature, taking box M will get you $10 more than taking L will.
Notice also: if you were to learn which prediction was made, you would be
happier to learn M than L, and evidential decision theorists would advise you
to take M—no matter what you learned. If you were to learn KL, you’d desire
M more than L. And if you were to learn KM , you’d desire M more than L.
Evidential decision theorists therefore violate a principle of deontic reflection:
they recommend options which they know your better informed, future self
will wish you had not chosen.4
We may dramatize this violation of deontic reflection in the case of New-
comb. Suppose that the evidential decision theorist faces Newcomb, and they
are playing, not for themselves, but rather for a poor orphan boy, Oliver. While
they are not allowed to look in the boxes, Oliver is. He is there with them as
they choose. He is allowed to offer the evidentialist advice about which box to
choose, but he is not allowed to tell them the contents of the boxes. He looks
inside, and says: ‘Please, choose box M ’. (Of course he does—the evidential-
ist knew that’s what he’d say, no matter what he saw). The evidential decision
theorist ignores Oliver’s advice, and chooses box L instead. They tell him: ‘If
you were able to tell me what the boxes contain, I would agree with you, and
I would choose M , no matter what you told me. But, since you haven’t told
me what’s in the boxes, I must take box L.’ At this point, the producers of the
game show—who are really pulling for Oliver—intervene. They say: ‘If you
allow him, Oliver may tell you what the boxes contain.’ The evidential deci-
sion theorist does not allow him. They say: ‘If I allow you to tell me what’s in
the boxes, then I will end up taking box M . But currently, I think that’s worse
than choosing L. So I think it’s better for me to not know.’ The producers try
a different tack. They say: ‘Alright, if you don’t listen to what Oliver has to say
about the contents of the boxes, then we’ll take $60 away from whatever Oliver
wins (perhaps leaving him with a bill to pay).’ The evidential decision theorist
knows that, if they listen to Oliver, they’ll take box M . They desire taking M
with a strength of $20. On the other hand, if they don’t listen, they’ll take box
L. They desire taking Lwith a strength of $90. Minus the $60 lost by not listen-
ing, not listening is desired with a strength of $30. So, in order to keep Oliver
quiet, they’ll take $60 away from him.5
Imagine yourself as Oliver, pleading with the evidential decision theorist
4. See Arntzenius (2008)
5. See Wells (2019).
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to take the box that you can see contains an additional $10. They are choosing
only for your benefit. You are telling them that M is the box which will most
benefit you. They believe you. They know that box M will benefit you the
most. Yet they refuse to take it. They moreover refuse to take the information
you are trying to give them, even though they know that this information is
not in any way misleading, that it will teach them what is objectively in your
best interest, and that their learning this information is objectively in your best
interest. To keep themselves from learning this information, they are willing
to take $60 away from you—though, again, their only concern is maximizing
your welfare. Does this look like the behavior of a rational agent? The causal
decision theorist thinks not, and I agree. And so I think that D does not give
an adequate measure of the choiceworthiness of an option. You should not
always choose the option which you’d be happiest to learn that you’d chosen.
Sometimes, you should be sad to learn that you’re choosing rationally.
1.3 Utility. According to the orthodox causal decision theorist, we should
measure the choiceworthiness of an option,X, not by looking at how glad you’d
be to learn that you have selected it,D(X), but rather by looking at the degree to
which you expectX to bring about your desired ends. For eachK ∈K,D(XK)
is the degree to which X would bring about your desired ends, were you to
choose it in the state K . So the quantity
U(X) def=
∑
K
Pr(K) ·D(XK)
tells us how desirable you expect choosing X to make the world.6
The difference between D and U is that, in D, we conditioned the proba-
bility function Pr on the proposition that you choose X. In U , we do not. Your
choice may give evidence that a state of nature obtains, but it does nothing to
bring that state about (that’s what it is for K to be a state of nature). According
to causalists, the fact that an option makes a desired state more likely doesn’t
speak in its favor if it doesn’t causally affect whether that state obtains or not.
Just as you may evaluate the utility of an option, X, from the perspective
you currently occupy, so too may you evaluate the utility of X from the per-
spective you would occupy, were you to choose another option, Y . (I mean:
the perspective you would occupy after learning only that you’d chosen Y , and
before learning anything else.) From this perspective, your probability for each
6. This is Skyrms’s formulation of causal decision theory. There are alternatives—see, e.g., So-
bel (1994), Lewis (1981a), Joyce (1999), and especially Rabinowicz (1982) and Rabinowicz
(2009). The differences between these version of CDT won’t make a difference to anything I
have to say here.
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state K would be Pr(K | Y ), and
UY (X) def=
∑
K
Pr(K | Y ) ·D(XK)
would be the utility of X. Given the quantities UY (X), for each pair of options
X and Y , we may calculate U(X) as follows.
U(X) =
∑
Y
UY (X) ·Pr(Y )
In a choice between two options, X and Y , both of the following situations
are possible:
Self-Undermining Choice
Once chosen, each option would have a lower utility than the al-
ternative
UX(Y ) > UX(X) and UY (X) > UY (Y )
Self-Reinforcing Choice
Once chosen, each option would have a higher utility than the al-
ternative
UX(X) > UX(Y ) and UY (Y ) > UY (X)
This can lead CDT’s verdicts to change as you make up your mind about what
to do. In a self-undermining choice, once you follow CDT’s advice and intend
to choose the option it called rational, it will change its mind and call your
choice irrational. In a self-reinforcing choice, if you disregard its advice and do
what it deemed irrational, CDT will change its mind and call you rational for
doing so.7
I believe that cases like these give us reason to doubt CDT. I defend a het-
erodox revision of causal decision theory whose verdicts do not depend upon
your option probabilities. But these kinds of choices won’t be relevant to the
arguments against CDT which I’ll introduce below.8 For those arguments, I
need only appeal to the following, minimal commitment of CDT, which is also
endorsed by heterodox causalists like myself:9
7. Cf. Gibbard & Harper (1978), Richter (1984), Weirich (1985), Harper (1986), Egan (2007),
Joyce (2012), Hare & Hedden (2016), Armendt (2019), and Williamson (forthcoming).
8. Though I’ll return to these kinds of choices in §5.
9. Minimal CDT is accepted by Wedgwood (2013), Barnett (ms), Spencer (forthcomingb),
Gallow (2020), and Podgorski (forthcoming), as well as by deliberational causal decision the-
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
D(Row Col) KA KB KC
A 0 −100 100
B 100 0 −100
C −100 100 0


Pr( Row |Col) A B C
KA 80% 10% 10%
KB 10% 80% 10%
KC 10% 10% 80%

Table 2: Desires and Probabilities for Utility Cycle
Minimal CDT In a choice between two options, X and Y , if X’s utility would
exceed Y ’s, whichever you chose,
UX(X) > UX(Y ) and UY (X) > UY (Y )
then X is required and Y is impermissible.
(Thus: I distinguish between CDT and Minimal CDT. The latter is strictly
weaker than the former; Minimal CDT only applies in choices between two
options, where the choice is neither self-undermining nor self-reinforcing.) In
Newcomb, Minimal CDT tells us that M is required and L is impermissible.
You know that, no matter what was predicted, M will get you $10 more than L
does. So, if you choose L, then the utility of M will exceed the utility of L by 10
(UL(M) = 100 and UL(L) = 90). And, if you choose M , then the utility of M
will exceed the utility of L by 10 (UM(M) = 20 and UM(L) = 10). So the utility
of M will exceed the utility of L, whichever box you happen to take.
2 Utility Cycle, andThree Objections to CDT
Consider the following decision problem:10
Utility Cycle
Before you are three boxes, labeled ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’. You may take
one and only one of the boxes. The contents of the boxes were
decided on the basis of a prediction about how you would choose.
If it was predicted that you would chooseA, $100 was left in B and
a bill for $100 was left in C. If it was predicted that you would
choose B, $100 was left in C and a bill for $100 was left in A. If it
was predicted you would choose C, $100 was left in A and a bill
for $100 was left in B. These predictions are 80% reliable.
Your desires and probabilities for this problem are shown in table 2. Which
orists like Skyrms (1990), Arntzenius (2008), and Joyce (2012, 2018).
10. Cf. Ahmed (2012) and Hare & Hedden (2016).
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option has the highest utility depends upon how likely you think you are to
select each option. Let ‘a’, ‘b’, and ‘c’ be your probabilities that you will take
box A, B, and C, respectively. Then:11
U(A) = 70(c − b) U(B) = 70(a− c) U(C) = 70(b − a)
So, for illustration: if you’re most likely to take A, and more likely to take B
than C (a > b > c), then B will have the highest utility; if you’re most likely
to take B, and more likely to take C than A (b > c > a), then C will have the
highest utility; and if you’re more likely to take C than A, and more likely to
take A than B (c > a > b), then A will have the highest utility.
Suppose now that you are given a choice between justA and B—C is taken
off of the menu (note, however, that even though you are guaranteed to not take
C, there is still a 10% probability that it was falsely predicted that you’d takeC).
In that case, your probability forC, c, is constrained to be zero, and the utilities
for A and B are:
U(A) = 70a− 70 U(B) = 70a
No matter the value of a, B will have a higher utility than A. So Minimal CDT
says that, in a choice between A and B, B is required and A is impermissible.
Suppose, on the other hand, that A is removed from the menu, and you are
given a choice between B and C. In that case, your probability for A, a, is
constrained to be zero, and the utilities of B and C are:
U(B) = 70b − 70 U(C) = 70b
Again, no matter the value of b, the utility of C will exceed the utility of B. So
Minimal CDT says that, in a choice between B and C, C is required and B is
impermissible. Similarly, if B is removed from the menu, and you are given a
choice between C and A, the utilities of C and A will be:
U(C) = 70c − 70 U(A) = 70c
The utility ofAwill exceed the utility ofC, no matter the value of c. SoMinimal
CDT says that, in a choice between C and A, A is required and C is impermis-
sible.
11. I will spare the reader the tedium of deriving everything explicitly in the main text. For those
who wish to check the math, some advice: multiply the matrix D(Row Col) by the matrix
Pr(Row|Col). This gives the matrix UCol(Row), of the utility of the row option, from the per-
spective you’d occupy immediately after choosing the column option. The identity U(Row) =∑
ColUCol(Row)·Pr(Col) can then be used to easily calculate the unconditional utilities,U(Row).
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2.1 The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. If we assume that Util-
ity Cycle is not a rational dilemma (i.e., if we assume that some option is
permissible), then Minimal CDT appears to lead to a violation of a principle
known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives (or just ‘IIA’).
IIA: If, given a choice between X and Y , Y is not permissible, then, given a
choice between X,Y , and Z , Y is not permissible.12
According to Minimal CDT, every option in Utility Cycle is impermissible
in a one-on-one choice with some alternative. So, if some option is permissi-
ble,13 we will have a violation of IIA. For illustration: suppose that A is a per-
missible choice in Utility Cycle. By Minimal CDT, given a choice between
A and B, A is impermissible. So A is not a permissible choice when you are
presented with the restricted menu {A,B}, but it is a permissible choice when
you are presented with the larger menu {A,B,C}. And this contradicts IIA. The
same goes if we say that B or C is permissible instead. For Minimal CDT says
that B is impermissible on the restricted menu {B,C}, and C is impermissible
on the restricted menu {C,A}.
2.2 Normal-FormExtensive-FormEquivalence. Utility Cycle also shows
that Minimal CDT violates a weak principle of normal-form extensive-form
equivalence (or just ‘NEE’).
NEE: If you are certain to remain rational and your beliefs and desires are cer-
tain to not change, then, if it is permissible to not choose X when given
a choice betweenX,Y , andZ , then, given a choice betweenX and going
on to choose between Y and Z , it is permissible to not choose X.
The antecedent of NEE is important. Suppose you think that your beliefs or
desires might change after choosing ∼X and before choosing between Y and
Z . Then, it may be rational to choose X now in order to take the decision out
of the hands of your not-entirely-trustworthy future self. Likewise, if you fear
that your future self will not choose rationally, this could give additional reason
to select X at stage one. However, restricted to cases where you are certain to
retain your beliefs, desires, and rationality, NEE is very plausible.
Consider now the following two choices:
12. We should sharply distinguish IIA from other principles that go by that name. For instance,
Podgorski (forthcoming) calls the following principle ‘the independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives’: Your preference between X and Y is a function of UX (X),UX (Y ),UY (X), and UY (Y )
alone. This principle is logically independent from the one I’m calling ‘IIA’. See Ray (1973) for
more on conflicting uses of ‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ in social choice theory.
13. By the symmetry of the case, we should conclude that every option is permissible, but we need
not assume this in order to make the present point.
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(a) A or ∼A (b) B or ∼B
Figure 1
A or ∼A
Money was distributed between boxes A, B, and C as in Utility
Cycle. At stage 1, you are given a choice to either take boxA or to
not. If you take box A, then you receive its contents. If you don’t
take A, then at stage 2, you choose between B and C. (See figure
1a.) You are certain to retain your beliefs, desires, and rationality
throughout.
B or ∼B
Money was distributed between boxes A, B, and C as in Utility
Cycle. At stage 1, you are given a choice to either take box B or to
not. If you take box B, then you receive its contents. If you don’t
take B, then at stage 2, you choose between A and C. (See figure
1b.) You are certain to retain your beliefs, desires, and rationality
throughout.
Assume you know that you abide Minimal CDT, and that you will continue to
do so throughout any sequential decisions. Then, in A or ∼A, if you choose
∼A at stage 1, at stage 2, you will choose C, and you know this at stage 1. So,
at stage 1, you face a choice between A and C. So A is required at stage 1. In B
or ∼B, if you choose ∼B at stage 1, then, at stage 2, you will choose A, and you
know this at stage 1. So, at stage 1, you face a choice between B and A. So B is
required at stage 1.
We can now show that, assuming some option is permissible, Minimal
CDT violates NEE in Utility Cycle. For, given the choice between A, B,
and C, B is either permissible or it is not. Suppose it is. Then, NEE says that
∼A is permissible in A or ∼A. Minimal CDT on the other hand, says that ∼A
is impermissible, contradicting NEE. Suppose on the other hand that B is im-
permissible. Then, it is permissible to not choose B. In that case, NEE says that
∼B is permissible in B or ∼B. Minimal CDT, on the other hand, says that ∼B
is impermissible, contradicting NEE. Either way, Minimal CDT contradicts
NEE.
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2.3 Predictable Long-run Poverty. Minimal CDT’s advice in Utility Cy-
cle may be exploited to lose you money in the long run. Suppose that, instead
of taking a box yourself, you select a box with the aid of an assistant. You tell the
assistant which box to take, but it is the assistant who makes the final choice.
(You keep the money. Note also that the reliable predictions are now about
which box your assistant will end up selecting.) By the symmetry of the case,
you see no reason to favor any box over the others, and you tell your assistant
to take box A. Before your assistant departs, they get an idea. They say: ‘Are
you sure? I’ll give you an opportunity to change to box B (but not box C—I’m
taking that off the menu). In exchange for changing your mind, I’ll require
$60.’ (You are certain that they will take this decision to be final, they will take
the box you decide upon, and that there’s no longer any way to get them to
take C.) At this point, you face a new decision: not between A, B, and C, but
instead between sticking with A and switching to B and losing $60. If a is your
probability for taking A, then the utilities of the available options are:
U(A) = 70a− 70 U(B) = 70a− 60
In this new decision, switching to Bwill have a higher utility than sticking with
A, no matter whether you takeA or switch toB. SoMinimal CDT says to hand
your assistant $60 to have them takeB instead. But you could have hadB in the
first place, for free. How could your assistant’s offer give you reason to switch?
Nothing changes if we suppose that you know in advance that your assistant
will make you an offer of this kind. Suppose you know all of the following in
advance: at stage 1, you will make an initial selection. Then, at stage 2, your
assistant will give you the opportunity to switch for $60. If your initial selection
at stage 1 is box A, then at stage 2, your assistant will offer you a choice of
whether to stick with A or pay $60 to switch to B. If your initial selection at
stage 1 is box B, then at stage 2, your assistant will offer you a choice of whether
to stick with B or pay $60 to switch to C. If your initial selection at stage 1 is
box C, then at stage 2, they’ll offer you a choice of whether to stick with C or
pay $60 to switch toA. In any of these cases, paying to switch will have a higher
utility than sticking with your initial selection, and Minimal CDT will require
you to pay to switch. So long as you abide Minimal CDT at stage 2, there’s no
initial selection you could make at stage 1 which would prevent your future self
from paying to switch at stage 2.
Note that, if you pay to switch, then you will likely end up losing money
overall. You have an 80% chance of breaking even, a 10% chance of winning
$100, and a 10% chance of losing $100—so you have an expected return of $0.
And you’ve just handed over $60. In the long run in which you make this deci-
sion over and over again, with your assistant offering the trade each time, you
will lose $60 on average. In contrast, someone who refuses the assistant’s offer
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Figure 2: Pay or A
to switch will break even, on average. Note also that every series of choices
permitted by Minimal CDT is causally dominated by another series of choices.
Whatever box you end up with after paying $60 to switch, you could have had
that box’s contents for free by simply making it your initial selection and refus-
ing to switch.
Causalists are used to making less money in certain decision problems. For
instance, anyone who takes box M in Newcomb will predictably make less
money, over the long run, than someone who takes box L. The usual causalist
reply is convincing: this is true, but only because those who take L will typi-
cally be provided with more money than those who take boxM . Being afforded
greater opportunities for wealth is no sign of rationality; nor is being afforded
fewer opportuntities for wealth a sign of irrationality. So predictable poverty
in Newcomb is no sign of irrationality.14 A comparable defense is not avail-
able here. In this case, it was not an unfortunate environment which led to
your poverty. Over the long run, someone who was indifferent between A and
B when given a choice between the two would never pay to switch, and they
would predictably end up making more money in the long run.
Minimal CDT will advise you to pay to have the options presented to you
in a certain order—even when you’re certain to retain your beliefs, desires, and
rationality throughout. For instance, consider Pay or A:
Pay or A
Money is distriuted between boxes A, B, and C as in Utility Cy-
cle. At stage 1, you may either pay $60, P , or not, ∼P . If you pay,
then, at stage 2, you will face the decision B or ∼B. If you do not,
then, at stage 2, you will face A or ∼A. (See figure 2.)
If you know that you abide Minimal CDT, you will choose A in A or ∼A. So,
14. See, e.g., Gibbard & Harper (1978), Lewis (1981b), Joyce (1999), Bales (2018), and Wells
(2019).
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if you don’t pay, you will end up choosing A. If you abide Minimal CDT, you
will choose B in B or ∼B. So, if you pay, you will end up choosing B. So, at
stage 1, you face a choice between paying $60 and taking box B and not paying
and taking box A. This is the same choice you faced with your assistant. And,
again, Minimal CDT tells you to pay the $60.
Again, paying likely leads to you losing money overall. Whether you play
A or ∼A or B or ∼B, the expected return is $0. So in the long run in which
you decide to pay in Pay or A over and over again, you will lose $60 on average.
Again, someone who was indifferent betweenA, B, andC when given a choice
between any two would predictably make more money when facing exactly the
same choice in exactly the same circumstances. The series of choices advised
by Minimal CDT—pay, then take B—is causally dominated. No matter what
was predicted, another series of choices—don’t pay, then refuse A, then take
B—makes $60 more. So this predictable poverty does not appear to be a con-
sequence of poor opportunities.
3 Options
These consequences of Minimal CDT look bad. These do not appear to be
the choices of a rational agent. It’s natural to see the foregoing as an argu-
ment against Minimal CDT. However, I want to urge caution. Though I re-
ject orthodox causal decision theory, I believe that the weaker claim Minimal
CDT is correct, and I accept what it says about Utility Cycle.15 Defenders of
Minimal CDT could reject the principles IIA and NEE;16 or they could insist
that Utility Cycle is a rational dilemma in which no option is permissible.17
These moves are available, but I think there’s a more attractive option. In my
view, the lesson causalists ought to draw from the case is this: the optionsA and
B are importantly different when they appear on the menu {A,B} than when
they appear on the larger menu {A,B,C}.
3.1 Individuating Options and Irrelevant Alternatives. IIA says that, if
you add an irrelevant option, Z , to the menu {X,Y }, this shouldn’t transform
an impermissible option into a permissible one. However, not every additional
option is truly irrelevant to your choice between the original options X and Y .
Some apparent counterexamples to IIA are not genuine counterexamples, be-
cause they involve new options which are relevant to how you should evaluate
15. That is to say: I accept what CDT says about the choice between any two options in Utility
Cycle. In a choice between A,B, and C, I say you should be indifferent between all three, and
that this does not depend upon your option probabilities. See [author] for details.
16. Cf. Wedgwood (2013), who rejects IIA.
17. Cf. Harper (1986).
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your choice between X and Y . For instance, consider the following putative
counterexample to IIA: You arrive at the boss’s house for dinner. If she offers
you soda or beer, you’re disposed to opt for soda (you don’t want to come off
like a drunkard). If she offers you soda, beer, or whiskey, you’re disposed to
opt for beer (you don’t want to come off as either too straight-laced or too in-
temperate).18 Do these choice dispositions violate IIA? No. What you value in
your drink choice is the signal it sends to your boss, and what signal it sends
can depend upon the alternatives she offers you. Additionally, if she offers you
whiskey, this provides you with important information about how that signal
will be received. This should change the way that you evaluate the options of
beer and soda, and it makes them relevantly different options.
When I presented IIA above, I simply took it for granted that the optionsX
andY were the samewhether they appeared on the menu {X,Y } or on the menu
{X,Y ,Z}. However, the sense in which X and Y could be the same is a subtle
one. By Leibniz’s Law, options appearing in different decision problems are
distinct. So, ifX and Y appear on a menu by themselves, then options identical
to X and Y could not appear on a larger menu with Z . Nonetheless, options
suitably similar to X and Y—call them ‘X∗’ and ‘Y ∗’—could appear on a menu
with Z . Suppose that the options 〈X,Y 〉 on a menu {X,Y } are similar to the
options 〈X∗,Y ∗〉 on a larger menu {X∗,Y ∗,Z} in all respects which are relevant
to rational choice. In that case, I’ll say that the options 〈X,Y 〉 are the same
as the options 〈X∗,Y ∗〉. (Thus, I distinguish between options being the same
and options being identical.) It’s only when the options 〈X∗,Y ∗〉 on the menu
{X∗,Y ∗,Z} are the same as the options 〈X,Y 〉 on the restricted menu {X,Y }
that Z is a truly irrelevant alternative to X and Y . So we can more carefully
state the principle IIA like this:
IIA If it is impermissible to choose X from the menu {X,Y } and the options
〈X∗,Y ∗〉 are the same as the options 〈X,Y 〉, then it is impermissible to
choose X∗ from the larger menu {X∗,Y ∗,Z}.
Similarly, we may more carefully state the principle NEE like this:
NEE If you are certain to remain rational and your beliefs and desires are cer-
tain to not change, it is permissible to not choose X from the menu
{X,Y ,Z}, X∗ is the same as the option X, and 〈Y ,Z〉 are the same as
〈Y ∗,Z∗〉, then, given a choice between X∗ and going on to choose be-
tween Y ∗ and Z∗, it is permissible to not choose X∗.
When I argued that Minimal CDT violated IIA and NEE above, I was
implicitly assuming that taking box A and taking box B were the same op-
tions whether they were the only available options or it was also an option
18. Cf. Sen (1993).
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to take box C. In general terms, I was assuming that two tuples of options,
X = 〈X1,X2, . . . ,XN 〉 and X∗ = 〈X∗1,X∗2, . . . ,X∗N 〉, in two different decision
problems, are the same iff (a) you desire each of the options X ∈ X to the same
degree as its corresponding option X∗ ∈ X∗, in every possible state of nature,
and (b) your subjective probability distribution over states, conditional on each
X ∈ X, is the same as your subjective probability distribution over states, con-
ditional on the correspondingX∗ ∈ X∗.19,20 Call this ‘the simple view’ of option
individuation.
The Simple View Given two different decisions, with menus of optionsM and
M∗, and given any n-tuple of options, X, from the menuM, an n-tuple
of options X∗ from the menuM∗ are the same as X iff, for every state of
nature K ,
(a) D(XK) =D(X∗K); and
(b) Pr(K | X) = Pr(K | X∗).21
This is a natural and plausible way of saying when two collections of options are
the same. According to it, beer and soda are relevantly different options when
they are the only options and when you have the additional option of whiskey.
That is: according to the simple view, whiskey is not an irrelevant alternative.
For, when you are offered whiskey as an alternative, this changes your opinions
about which signals beer and soda will send, which will change the degree to
which you desire choosing beer and soda in some state of nature.
Some causalists may wish to say that your option probabilities also play
an important role in determining when options are the same. They may wish
to say that X and X∗ are the same iff, for each X ∈ X and its corresponding
X∗ ∈ X∗: a) D(XK) = D(X∗K), for each state of nature K ; b) Pr(K | X) =
Pr(K | X∗), for each K ; and c) Pr(X) = Pr(X∗). This would reconcile Minimal
CDTwith IIA, but at the price of trivializing the latter. Given a menu of options
{X,Y }, you will necessarily have Pr(X)+Pr(Y ) = 1. Then, given a larger menu
{X∗,Y ∗,Z}, the only way for 〈X∗,Y ∗〉 to be the same as 〈X,Y 〉 would be for
Pr(Z) to be zero. On this proposal, so long as you leave open that you’ll select
each available option, you’ll never be presented with the same options on a
larger menu, and principles like IIA and NEE will impose no constraint at all.
19. If X ∈ X is the kth option in X, then the corresponding option in X∗ is the kth option in X∗.
20. Notation: I am abusing set-theoretic notation, applying it to tuples instead of sets. So ‘X ∈ X’
says that X is one of the options in the tuple X.
21. To be clear: when I write equations like ‘D(XK) = D(X∗K)’ and ‘Pr(K | X) = Pr(K | X∗)’, the
desire and probability functions on the left should be understood to be the desire and probability
functions from the first decision problem, d, and those on the right should be understood to be
the desire and probability functions from the second decision problem, d∗.
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Alternatively, we may wish to say that your (unconditional) state probabil-
ities help to determine when some collection of options are the same. That is,
we may suggest: X andX∗, in two different decision problems, are the same op-
tions iff, for each X ∈ X and its corresponding X∗ ∈ X∗: a) D(XK) = D(X∗K)
for each K ; b) Pr(K | X) = Pr(K | X∗) for each K ; and c) each K has the same
unconditional probability, Pr(K). This suggestion does not trivialize IIA and
NEE, though it has other undesirable consequences. For note that the law of
total probability tells us that each K ’s unconditional probability is a weighted
average of its probability conditional on each option, with weights given by your
option probabilities, Pr(K) =∑X Pr(K | X) ·Pr(X). And note that, while your
conditional probabilities Pr(K | X) are fixed, as you deliberate about what to
do, your option probabilities, Pr(X), will change. Let us narrow our atten-
tion to the kinds of cases in which EDT and CDT disagree—cases in which
Pr(K | X) , Pr(K | Y ), for some X , Y . Call these the ‘interesting’ cases. In
the interesting cases, changes in your option probabilities will lead to changes
in your (unconditional) state probabilities. So, on this suggestion, the very act
of deliberating about what to choose changes the options between which you
are choosing. This is odd. We normally think that the options about which you
should be deliberating are the possible objects of choice for you. And, accord-
ing to this proposal for individuating options, this won’t be so in interesting
cases. If you were to resolve to choose X, you would give yourself the evidence
that you will chooseX; so your option probabilityPr(X)would go up, and your
unconditional probability distribution over states would change. So the option
you would end up choosing would be relevantly different from the one about
which you were initially deliberating. Also, note that, if we individuate decision
problems partly in terms of the options available to you, then this method of
individuating options would mean that it is impossible to make up your mind
about what to do in an interesting decision problem. Making up your mind
would change the decision problem you face. (The same considerations apply
to the suggestion to individuate options in terms of your option probabilities.)
So I don’t think that we should appeal to your option probabilities or your
state probabilities as a way of distinguishing the options 〈A,B〉 on the menu
{A,B} from the options 〈A,B〉 on the larger menu {A,B,C}. Nonetheless, I
think that we should distinguish the options 〈A,B〉 on the first menu from the
options 〈A,B〉 on the second.22 In §3.2, I’ll offer the causalist a different account
of when two collections of options are the same (§3.2). I will then explain how
this account allows causalists to dispute the charge that they violate IIA and
22. Though I wish to distinguish the option of taking boxAwhen box B is the only alternative from
the option of taking box A when C is the only alternative, I’ll continue to use the notation ‘A’
for the option of taking box A, whatever the alternatives happen to be. Context should make it
clear which options I am talking about.
16
§3. Options
NEE in Utility Cycle (§4).
3.2 Utility Profiles. We should want to individuate options in such a way
that the available options remain the same throughout deliberation, so we should
want to individuate them in terms of a property which does not change during
deliberation. One property like this is the conditional probability of each state,
K , given each option X, Pr(K | X). This is one reason why the simple view is
so natural.
But there are other important properties of options which do not change
over the course of deliberation. In particular: the utilities you would assign to
each option, were you to learn that you’d chosen any of the options—that is,
the values UY (X), for eachX and Y—do not change as you deliberate. And my
suggestion to causalists is that they individuate a collection of options,X, partly
in terms of these quantities. If this is done carelessly, it can end up trivializing
principles like IIA and NEE. Given a choice between X and Y , there are two
potential post-choice perspectives from which to evaluate the utilities ofX and
Y—these are the perspectives encoded in UX and UY . Given a choice between
X, Y , and Z , there are three: UX , UY , and UZ . If this is enough to make 〈X,Y 〉
count as different options, then it will be impossible for the same options to
appear on two different menus, and IIA will impose no constraint at all.
So let us proceed carefully. Suppose you face a decision problem with the
menu of optionsM, and the options in the tupleX = 〈X1,X2, . . . ,XN 〉 are all on
the menuM. Let us defineX’s utility profile, on the menuM—which I’ll write
‘UM(X)’—to be the set of the utilities which are assigned to the options X ∈ X,
from the perspective you’d occupy after having selected any of the options Y ∈
M.
UM(〈X1,X2, . . . ,XN 〉) def= {〈UY (X1),UY (X2), . . . ,UY (XN )〉 | Y ∈M}
Notice that X’s utility profile does not vary with your option probabilities. So,
if we individuate options in terms of their utility profiles, the available options
will not change during deliberation. Nor does individuating options in terms
of their utility profiles trivialize principles like IIA. Take a mundane example:
the utilities of steak and chicken do not depend upon whether you order steak,
chicken, or fish. So we may say that steak and chicken are the same options
whether they are the only options on the menu or whether fish is also an option.
Then, IIA will say that, if it is not permissible to choose steak from the first
menu, it’s not permissible to choose it from the second menu, either.
Additionally, in the interesting cases where CDT and EDT part ways, op-
tions on two different menus can share a utility profile. Suppose that, in New-
comb, we include an additional box, labeled ‘O’, which is guaranteed to con-
tain the same amount of money as L. If it was predicted that you’d take L,
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then there is $100 in both L and O and $110 in M . If it was predicted that
you’d take either O or M , then there’s $10 in M and nothing in either L or O.
As in the original Newcomb, these predictions are 90% reliable.23 This addi-
tional option will not affect the utility profile of the options 〈L,M〉. For the
perspective on L and M which you’d have after learning that you’d chosen O
is precisely the same as the perspective on L and M you’d have after choosing
M . So U{L,M}(〈L,M〉) = U{L,M,O}(〈L,M〉) = {〈90,100〉,〈10,20〉}. And we will
be able to say that taking box L and taking box M are the same options before
and after boxO is added. Thus, O will be an irrelevant alternative, and IIA will
tell us that, if L is impermissible to select in the original Newcomb, it is also
impermissible to select when O is included on the menu of options.24
More carefully, the suggestion is:25
Same Option Given two different decisions, with menus of options M and
M∗, and given any n-tuples of options X from the menuM, an n-tuple
of options X∗ from the menuM∗ are the same as X iff, for every state of
nature K ,
(a) D(XK) =D(X∗K);
(b) Pr(K | X) = Pr(K | X∗); and
(c) UM(X) = UM∗(X∗).
4 Escaping the Cycle
If Same Option is accepted, then the options 〈A,B〉 on the restricted menu
{A,B}will be different from the options 〈A,B〉 on the expanded menu {A,B,C}.
23. That is: conditional on your choosing either M or O, you’re 90% sure that there’s $0 in L and O
and $10 in M ; and, conditional on your choosing L, you’re 90% sure that there’s $100 in L and
O and $110 in M .
24. Objection: Suppose that, conditional on choosing O, you are 100% sure that there’s $0 in L and
O and $10 in M . Then O will introduce a new potential post-choice perspective on 〈L,M〉. But
O should still be treated as an irrelevant alternative, and you should still choose M once it is
added. Reply: I agree that you should still choose M in this decision problem, and that, in some
good sense of ‘irrelevant’,O is an irrelevant option (you certainly shouldn’t choose it), but I don’t
take it to be an objection to Same Option that it, together with IIA, does not tell us so. We can’t
expect weak principles like IIA to tell us everything; it is enough that they tell us something
non-trivial.
25. Notice that the following kind of situation is possible: it could be that (a) the 1-tuples 〈X〉 and
〈X∗〉 share a utility profile, (b) the 1-tuples 〈Y 〉 and 〈Y ∗〉 share a utility profile, yet (c) the pairs
〈X,Y 〉 and 〈X∗,Y ∗〉 do not share a utility profile. So, given Same Option, X could be the same
option as X∗, and Y could be the same option as Y ∗ without 〈X,Y 〉 being the same options
as 〈X∗,Y ∗〉. It’s therefore important that we formulated IIA as we did, requiring that the tuple
〈X,Y 〉 be the same as the tuple 〈X∗,Y ∗〉, and not just that X and Y be the same as X∗ and Y ∗
individually.
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On the restricted menu, the utility profile of 〈A,B〉 only contains perspectives
from which the utility of B exceeds the utility of A, U{A,B}(〈A,B〉) = {〈0,70〉,
〈−70,0〉}. Whereas, on the expanded menu, the utility profile of 〈A,B〉 con-
tains an additional perspective from which the utility of A exceeds the utility
of B, U{A,B,C}(〈A,B〉) = {〈0,70〉, 〈−70,0〉, 〈70,−70〉}. So, according to Same
Option, the options 〈A,B〉 are relevantly different when they appear on the
expanded menu alongside C. This means that, if options are individuated ac-
cording to Same Option, then Minimal CDT does not violate IIA in Utility
Cycle.
For similar reasons, individuating options with Same Option means that
Minimal CDT does not violate NEE. For, on the menu {A,∼A} = {A, {B,C}},
A’s utility profile contains no negative values, {〈0〉,〈70〉}.26 (Since you are sure
that choosing ∼A will lead your future self to choose C, your probability dis-
tribution over states, conditional on ∼A, is the same as your probability distri-
bution over states, conditional onC, so U∼A(A) is equal to UC(A).) But, on the
full menu {A,B,C}, A’s utility profile is {〈−70〉,〈0〉,〈70〉}. So, when you are
asked to take box A or leave it, you are being offered a different (and better)
option than you are offered when you’re given a choice betweenA,B, orC, and
we do not have a violation of NEE. Likewise, if we accept Same Option, then
we should object to my earlier claim that those who abide Minimal CDT will
pay to have options presented to them in a certain order. On the contrary: they
will pay to be presented with different (and better) options.
No amount of quibbling about how to individuate options will change the
fact that those who abide Minimal CDT will lose $60, on average, in the se-
quential decisions from §2.3, while those who are always indifferent between
A,B, and C given a choice between any two, will break even, on average. But I
think that causalists should accept and defend this consequence of their view.
In the first place, they can offer a tu quoque: in other sequential decisions, evi-
dentialists will end up predictably poorer than causalists.27 More convincingly,
they can object to using outcomes in sequential decisions to evaluate the ratio-
nality of agents who are incapable of binding their future selves to a certain
course of action. The temporal parts of these agents are like separate agents,
each facing their own, separate decisions, and incapable of coordinating their
actions. The fact that such agents can be led to predictable ruin through a series
of rational choices is just an intrapersonal tragedy of the commons.28 (We may
think that intrapersonal tragedies of the commons are not possible, because we
26. I’m sloppily conflating options and 1-tuples containing those options.
27. See Wells (2019) and Ahmed (2020).
28. See Arntzenius et al. (2004) for further defense of this view, and see Meacham (2010) for a
reply. See also Ahmed (2014b, §7.4.3) and Spencer (forthcominga, §5).
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think that the rationality of later choices is importantly constrained in some
way by which choices were made earlier, and for which reasons.29 Whether
that’s so is an interesting debate, but it cross-cuts the debate between evidential-
ists and causalists. Causalists and evidentialists both have the option to affirm
or deny that, at the beginning of a sequential decision problem, you should
form the plan or the intention which is most choiceworthy, and that, ceteris
paribus, rationality demands that you stick to that plan or follow through on
that intention. If either affirms, they won’t face these kinds of objections; if
either denies, they will.)
5 Further Discussion
The question of when causalists should count options in different decision prob-
lems as being effectively the same or importantly different is interesting in its
own right. But the discussion here bears on other, internecine causalist dis-
putes. As I briefly mentioned in §1.3 above, there are decision problems in
which orthodox CDT’s verdicts depend upon how likely you think you are to
choose each available option. Some find CDT’s verdicts about these cases ob-
jectionable,30 and some have suggested heterodox causalist theories of ratio-
nal choice to treat these cases.31 An objection which has been raised to some
of these heterodox theories is that they run afoul of the IIA.32 One important
upshot of our discussion here is that this criticism is misplaced. Apparent vi-
olations of IIA arise in similar ways for orthodox CDT; and the solution I’ve
proffered causalists is available to the heterodox and orthodox both. More-
over, while this solution allows the heterodox causalist theory I favor to always
satisfy IIA and NEE, the same cannot be said for orthodox CDT.
Recall, in Self-Reinforcing Choice, choosing either option would give
you the good news that your choice will make things better than the alternative
would—UX(X) > UX(Y ) and UY (Y ) > UY (X). For a concrete case like this,
consider:33
Cake in Damascus
You must choose whether to go to Damascus or Aleppo. Yester-
29. See, e.g., McClennan (1990) and Bratman (1999).
30. See, e.g., Richter (1984), Egan (2007), Briggs (2010), Wedgwood (2013), Ahmed (2014a),
Spencer & Wells (2019), Gallow (2020, forthcoming), Spencer (forthcominga), and Pod-
gorski (forthcoming).
31. See, e.g., Wedgwood (2013), Barnett (ms), Spencer (forthcomingb), Gallow (2020), and
Podgorski (forthcoming).
32. See, e.g., Bassett (2015) and the discussion in Wedgwood (2013) and Barnett (ms).
33. Similar cases are discussed in Hunter & Richter (1978) and Hare & Hedden (2016). (‘Cake
in Damascus’ is a reference to Gibbard & Harper (1978)’s ‘Death in Damascus’.)
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[D(Row Col) KA KD
A 100 0
D 0 100
] [Pr( Row | Col) A D
KA 70% 25%
KD 30% 75%
]
Table 3: Desires and Probabilities for Cake in Damascus. (‘A’ says that you go to
Aleppo, ‘D ’ says that you go to Damascus, ‘KA’ says that it was predicted that you’d got
to Aleppo, and ‘KD ’ says that it was predicted that you would go to Damascus.)
day, your fairy godmother made a prediction about which you
would choose, and she left you cake in the predicted city. Her pre-
dictions are quite reliable, but she has a tendency to guess Damas-
cus. Conditional on you going to Damascus, you’re 75% sure that
cake awaits in Damascus; whereas, conditional on you going to
Aleppo, you’re only 70% sure that cake awaits there. Getting cake
is the only thing you care about.
Your desires and probabilities for Cake in Damascus are shown in table 3.
As the reader may verify for themselves, in this choice, UA(A) = 70 > 30 =
UA(D), and UD(D) = 75 > 25 = UD(A). So this case has the structure of
Self-Reinforcing Choice. Going to Damascus gives you the good news that
cake likely awaits in Damascus. And going to Aleppo gives you the good news
that cake likely awaits in Aleppo.
In Cake in Damascus choosing either option would give you good news
about what you are doing to make the world better. However, one of the op-
tions (going to Damascus) gives you better news about what you are doing to
make things better. Orthodox CDT says that which option you should choose
depends upon your option probabilities. I disagree. I say you should choose the
option which would give you the best news about what you’re doing to bring
about your desired ends. I won’t discuss this theory here—see [author] for
details. The important point for present purposes is just this: according to this
theory, to determine which ofX and Y is more choiceworthy, you must look at
the quantities UX(X),UY (X),UX(Y ), and UY (Y )—that is, you must look at ex-
actly the values which appear in the utility profile of 〈X,Y 〉. Moreover, for this
reason, the theory of rational choice I favor will always satisfy IIA and NEE.
Orthodox CDT has a harder time satisfying IIA and NEE in general. Sup-
pose that you always begin deliberation thinking that you are equally likely to
select each of the available options. Then, in cases with the structure of Self-
Reinforcing Choice, orthodox CDT will violate both IIA and NEE, even
when options are individuated with Same Option.34
34. Below, I discuss orthodox CDT’s violation of IIA. For a discussion of its violation of NEE, see
Joyce (2018).
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For illustration, return to Cake in Damascus. Suppose that you always
begin deliberation by distributing your option probabilities evenly. Then, at the
beginning of deliberation, you will assign A and D the utilities U(A) = 42.5
and U(D) = 52.5. So orthodox CDT will say that A is impermissible and that
D is required. It will not change this verdict as you resolve to go to Damascus
and raise your option probability forD to 100%. But now suppose we introduce
an additional option: a new road to Aleppo has opened up. This road doesn’t
differ from the original road in any respect that you care about. You now face a
choice between A (going to Aleppo via the original road), A∗ (going to Aleppo
via the new road), andD (going to Damascus). If you again begin deliberation
by distributing your option probabilities evenly, then you will assignA,A∗, and
D the utilities: U(A) = U(A∗) = 55 and U(D) = 45. So CDT will say that A is
permissible. It will continue to say this as you resolve to choose A (or A∗) and
raise your option probability for A (or A∗) to 100%.
So, in your choice between A and D , CDT says that A is impermissible.
But, in your choice between A,D, and A∗, it says that A is permissible. Since
the options 〈A,D〉 have the same utility profile in both of these choices, CDT
violates IIA, given that options are individuated with SameOption. (Again, we
could attempt to say that your different option probabilities are enough to make
A and D in the second choice importantly different options than they were in
the first. But, again, this trivializes IIA—if you always begin deliberation by
giving positive probability to each available option, then IIA will never apply.
And, again, we could attempt to say that your different (unconditional) state
probabilities are enough to make the optionsA andD different. But, again, this
would have the uncomfortable consequence that the options between which
you are choosing change as you make up your mind about what to do—recall
the discussion in §3.2. There is also always the possibility of simply rejecting the
principles IIA; though, in my view, we should want to hold on to this plausible
principle if we can.)
Heterodox causalist theories like mine have been criticized for violating the
independence of irrelevant alternatives.35 It is therefore worth noting that the
apparent violations of IIA are not unique to the heterodox; orthodox CDT also
appears to violate the principle, and in similar ways. Moreover, while ortho-
dox CDT has additional difficulty complying with IIA in cases like Cake in
Damascus, my theory of rational choice will never violate IIA, once options
are individuated with Same Option.
35. See, for instance, the discussion in Wedgwood (2013), Bassett (2015), and Barnett (ms).
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6 Conclusion
In summation, choices like Utility Cycle afford us three arguments against
MinimalCDT. I’ve presented these arguments and offered causalists three replies.
The first two objections: in Utility Cycle, Minimal CDT appears to violate
weak versions of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and normal-
form extensive-form equivalence (NEE). In response to these objections, I’ve
counseled causalists to individuate options in part according to their utility
profiles. Individuating options in this way prevents the principles from being
trivialized and preventsMinimalCDT from violating the principles in Utility
Cycle.
The final objection: in sequential decision problems, those who abideMin-
imal CDT will end up predictably poorer than those who follow EDT, even
when they have exactly the same amount of money in front of them, sitting
in exactly the same place. In response to this objection, I’ve counseled causal-
ists to accept this consequence of their view as an unfortunate intrapersonal
tragedy of the commons—avoidable by those lucky agents capable of binding
their future selves. Accepting this consequence means that those of us who like
diachronic Dutch book arguments will have to be much more careful about we
how formulate them. Accepting this consequence also means rejecting another
recent argument against EDT. Wells (2019) argues agaisnt EDT by contending
that, if I predictably make less money than you do in a sequential decision when
we hold fixed the state of nature, this shows that I am choosing irrationally. No-
tice, however, that in the sequential decision Pay or A, causalists who pay $60
and go on to choose B will be certain to make $60 less than evidentialists who
don’t pay and go on to choose B—no matter which prediction was made. So
endorsing an argument like Wells’s means abandoning Minimal CDT.36
36. See also Ahmed (2020)’s criticism of Wells (2019).
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